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Abstract
The marginalization of trade unions was a notable feature of the sovereign debt cri-
sis in the Eurozone periphery. However, governments have recently imposed liberal-
izing reforms against union protests in the Eurozone core too. We argue that
organized labour loses influence across the core-periphery divide because the ‘new
economic governance’ puts national governments under enhanced pressure to
compete against each other on wage and labour market flexibility—a process known
as competitive internal devaluation. The article illustrates this argument through
comparative quantitative indicators of liberalization and qualitative process-tracing
in three core countries. Whereas Germany’s outstanding competitiveness position
allowed its unions to extract significant concessions, their counterparts in France
and Finland faced unprecedented defeats from governments aiming to restore eco-
nomic growth by closing down the competitiveness gap to Germany. Our findings
highlight the class power implications of the Eurozone’s reliance on the labour mar-
ket as the main economic adjustment variable.
Key words: political economy, industrial relations, public policy, welfare state, labor markets,
Europe
JEL classification: J51 trade unions, J58 public policy, P16 political economy
1. Introduction
The impact of the Eurozone crisis on the trade unions of the periphery has been adverse and
deep. Faced with austerity and competitiveness demands, governments of virtually all parti-
san colours pursued reform strategies that rejected union demands to facilitate labour mar-
ket liberalization against all odds (Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012; Culpepper and Regan,
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2014). These periphery countries, so the logic goes, have faced not only an asymmetric
shock to their disadvantage (Hall, 2014; Johnston and Regan, 2016), but also display trade
unions that have become too weak to influence public policy (Culpepper and Regan, 2014).
Comparative studies, therefore, emphasize that while trade unions of the Northern
European ‘core’ continued to receive policy concessions from the state during the crisis, their
counterparts in the Southern European ‘periphery’ lost any significant influence over policy
change (Marginson, 2015; Lehndorff, 2015; Lehndorff et al., 2017).
In this article, however, we argue that trade unions of the Eurozone core are not insu-
lated from such defeats in policy-making, which we define as instances of labour market re-
form that contradict the union confederations’ publicly stated policy preferences and
provide no single concession to them. While the previous literature highlights the exclusion
of union preferences in periphery countries during the crisis period from around 2010 to
2014, we observe similar patterns of union marginalization in core countries during the
post-crisis period since 2015.1
We attribute the demise of union influence in policy-making across the core-periphery di-
vide to the demands posed by the Eurozone’s institutional framework to stimulate the econ-
omy through a downwards adjustment of wages and thus prices. By reinforcing the
emphasis on cost competitiveness in the availability of domestic growth strategies, the EU
‘new economic governance’ puts national governments under enhanced pressure to compete
against each other on wage and labour market flexibility—a process known as competitive
internal devaluation. Whilst not exclusive to Eurozone countries, we contend that this pro-
cess is more pronounced therein, due to institutionalized constraints on fiscal spending and
wage growth in a common currency union. Whereas the long-term economic prospects of
such a concerted strategy are questionable in functional terms (IMF, 2012, 2016), the politi-
cal implication of internal devaluation is the disempowerment of trade unions in the interest
of generating short-term business confidence.
This article uses comparative quantitative indicators and qualitative case studies of
France, Finland and Germany to illustrate the impact of competitive pressures on the policy-
making influence of trade unions in the Eurozone core since the global financial crisis of
2008, with a particular focus on the reform activity of the past 5 years. We select cases that
display variation in the degree of competitive pressures as a source of structural union power
(i.e. our explanans) and thus union influence in policy-making (i.e. our explanandum), while
providing grounds to address alternative ‘domestic politics’ explanations at the same time.
Whereas German unions received concessions from the state by benefitting from the struc-
tural advantage of an outstanding competitiveness position, trade unions in France and
Finland suffered defeats from governments imposing liberalizing reforms in an effort to close
down the competitiveness gap to Germany. Our case selection puts our argument to a hard
test, as the process of internal devaluation against union protests took place under both
right and left governments across different varieties of capitalism and trade unionism.
1 With the term ‘crisis period’, we essentially refer to the period by which the global financial crisis
from 2008 onwards turned into a sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone periphery. In our view, this cri-
sis period ended in around 2013–2014, as the ECB’s (2012) previous shift in 2012 to a policy of ‘cheap
money’ had materialized in sustainably reducing the spread between the sovereign bonds of the
Eurozone periphery on the hand, and Germany on the other. We thus call the subsequent 5 years
from 2015 to 2020 the ‘post-crisis period’.
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Despite these differences, trade unions lost influence in similar ways when cost competitive-
ness deteriorated in a context of economic slowdown (France and Finland), whereas they
(re-)gained influence when cost competitiveness improved (Germany). In other words, the
Eurozone’s institutional framework has turned the competitive position of a country into a
crucial source of structural union power.
Our findings highlight the class power implications of the ‘new European economic gov-
ernance’, which rules out wage-led growth strategies and directs political attention on the la-
bour market as the main economic adjustment variable. Our argument about competitive
internal devaluation is in line with recent accounts of the post-Keynesian (Stockhammer,
2016) and critical political economy literature (Erne, 2015; Bieler et al., 2019; Jordan et al.,
2020) in pointing to the interconnectedness of domestic reform struggles in an integrated
European political economy. Although political contestation over labour market and wel-
fare state reform remains primarily national in character (hence our primary focus on
domestic-level developments), the new economic governance links the fortunes of trade
unions and working people across the core-periphery divide.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we outline the theorized relationship between com-
petitive internal devaluation and union influence in the Eurozone, followed by the presenta-
tion of comparative quantitative indicators on policy measures in support of our claim.
Section 3 outlines our case selection strategy and methodological approach. In Sections 4 to
6, we show through process-tracing how competitive pressures put governments under pres-
sure to dismiss trade union demands in France and Finland, whereas this pressure was ab-
sent in Germany over the entire period, leading to divergence in the direction of labour
market reform. A final section concludes.
2. The political economy of competitive internal devaluation
The creation of the Eurozone rested on monetarist assumptions of economic convergence
through central bank independence and fiscal discipline. Both conditions would incentivize the
adoption of supply-side labour market reforms to ensure sufficient wage flexibility in a mone-
tary union of diverse varieties of capitalism. Following these assumptions, preparations to
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) membership during the 1990s required governments to
limit inflation and public debt levels as part of the ‘Maastricht convergence criteria’, while the
design of the European Central Bank (ECB) followed the German Bundesbank model by
restricting its mandate to the objective of price stability (excluding employment stability).
In the Eurozone’s institutional framework, the governments’ dominant instruments of
economic adjustment have thus been wage and labour market flexibility ever since. Yet, the
idea of domestic supply-side adjustment was complicated by the ‘stickiness’ of labour mar-
ket institutions in diverse European growth models. Broadly, previous research in compara-
tive political economy distinguished between the export-led regime in the Northern ‘core’
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, France) and
the demand-led regime in the Southern ‘periphery’ (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), each
underpinned by historically evolved wage-setting regimes and distinct political coalitions
(Hall, 2014; Johnston and Regan, 2016; Regan, 2017; Ho¨pner and Lutter, 2018).2
2 Scholars of Eurozone integration are broadly unanimous in classifying France as a ‘core’ country (cf.
Johnston et al., 2014; Regan, 2017). However, France is more reliant than other core countries on
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According to this literature, whilst the former group of countries possesses the coordinat-
ing capacities to ensure wage restraint for successful export performance, the latter group
does not. It follows that the core has a structural advantage compared to the periphery in
adjusting to the competitiveness demands of a hard currency union (Regan, 2017). Faced
with this adjustment problem, recent contributions highlighted that the periphery could sus-
tain its dependence on domestic demand through reduced costs for external borrowing and
cross-border banking loans coming from savers in the core (Jones, 2015). Aggravated by
weak productivity growth in the periphery, these trends reinforced long-standing patterns of
‘uneven and combined development’ within the EU political economy (Bieler et al., 2019),
and resulted in growing current account imbalances that were at the heart of the Eurozone
crisis.
However, as the nature of the crisis shifted from an economic downturn to a sovereign
debt crisis, EU policy-makers in tandem with the German government attributed its origins
to a lack of fiscal discipline and cost competitiveness, and thus reinforced the Eurozone’s re-
liance on internal devaluation as the main adjustment mechanism (Armingeon and Baccaro,
2012; Pe´rez and Matsaganis, 2019). The first step in this direction came with the introduc-
tion of the so-called ‘European Semester’ in 2010, whereby the European Commission (EC)
issues annual country-specific recommendations to monitor and coordinate domestic eco-
nomic policies across the EU. The member states must then incorporate these recommenda-
tions into national ‘reform programs’ that are again assessed by the EC. Secondly, in 2011,
the introduction of the so-called ‘Six Pack’ implied tightened surveillance mechanisms
through the ‘Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure’ (MIP). This is based on two instru-
ments: (a) an alert mechanism for the early detection of macroeconomic imbalances based
on a ‘scoreboard’ of economic indicators, which highlight unit labour costs (ULCs) develop-
ments and (b) financial sanctions in case of non-compliance with the recommendations is-
sued by the alert system. When the EC identifies an excessive macroeconomic imbalance in
member states, the concerned government has to present a ‘corrective action plan’, which
typically includes competitiveness-enhancing structural reforms of the labour market
(Schulten and Mu¨ller, 2013; Erne, 2015). Finally, the introduction of the ‘Fiscal Compact’
in 2012 requires that the balanced budget condition of the Stability and Growth Pact be
enshrined in constitutional law and the structural deficit (adjusted for cyclical effects) be no
>0.5% of GDP, implying tightened constraints on wage growth in the public sector.
Overall, these governance innovations and the renewed focus on external competitiveness as
a benchmark of imbalances enhanced ‘European interventionism in the area of wage policy’
(Schulten and Mu¨ller, 2013, p. 201).
Non-compliance with tightened fiscal rules and wage surveillance mechanisms not only
bears the potential threat of financial sanctions (Erne, 2015). It may also prove detrimental
to the economic credibility of a member state and thus enhance pressure from international
markets by causing higher interests for debt servicing and the abstention of mobile capital
internal demand, sustained historically by public spending and investment (Lux, 2015), as well as on
state-led support for promoting export performance (Amable, 2017). These characteristics make
France a sui generis political economy model, with some fragilities in its long-term economic perfor-
mance, triggered by the slow liberalization of its state-led model of coordination since the mid-1980s
(Levy, 2017). Due to these features, some authors characterize it as located on the ‘perimeter’ of the
core (cf. Magone et al., 2016)—a characterization that we subscribe to.
4 P. Rathgeb and A. Tassinari
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from foreign direct investment. In other words, the degree to which governments conform to
the policy demands of the new economic governance sends signals to managers, credit rating
agencies and international finance about the risks of government bonds, capital flows and
future investments.
The outcome of tightened fiscal rules and wage surveillance mechanisms in a common
currency union is heightened cost competition. While the new economic governance implied
union-hostile interventionism in return for financial assistance in the Eurozone periphery
during the sovereign debt crisis, it has started to put trade unions of the Eurozone core under
pressure when their relative cost competitiveness standing deteriorated. More specifically,
within the common currency framework of the Eurozone, trade unions cannot escape the
cost competition exerted by Germany’s aggressive wage restraint, given the absence of fiscal
and monetary tools to offset possible losses of cost competitiveness. As high value-added
goods tend to be produced in the Eurozone’s Northern core countries, their industrial struc-
tures and export baskets have faced direct competition from Germany’s internal devaluation
period during the 2000s (Dølvik and Marginson, 2018, p. 411).
Given its dominant position in intra-European trade, German labour costs have become
the benchmark for the Eurozone’s wage surveillance mechanisms and domestic collective
bargaining (CB), especially in export manufacturing. As a result, the German ‘employment
miracle’ in the wake of its internal devaluation strategy influences the discourse around the
‘requirements’ of labour market reform among its trading partners (Lux, 2018).
Recommendations issued under the European Semester to countries with negative growth
and public finance outlooks routinely cite the imperative of restoring external competitive-
ness through greater wage and labour market flexibility. Employer associations, in turn, le-
gitimize their demands for liberalizing reforms by pointing to Germany’s enormous current
account surpluses, which serves as a ‘blueprint’ for a successful economic adjustment
(Lehndorff, 2014).
Whilst governments are the main enactors of internal devaluation, it is important to note
that enhanced cost competition in a context of tightened fiscal rules and wage surveillance
mechanisms has taken place against the backdrop of a neoliberal re-orientation of employer
associations, especially driven by the preferences of large export-oriented employers.
Whereas contributions in the Varieties of Capitalism tradition emphasized employers’ de-
pendence on union cooperation in skill development, a more recent literature has
highlighted that manufacturing employers have turned into supporters of labour market lib-
eralization across diverse coordinated market economies (Paster, 2012; Emmenegger, 2015;
Baccaro and Howell, 2017). In the German case, for example, Baccaro and Benassi (2016)
attribute the neoliberal outlook of manufacturing employers to the enhanced price-
sensitivity of the machinery and transportation sectors under the conditions of globalized
competition. The neoliberal re-orientation of employer associations implies a preference for
weakening the bargaining power of trade unions as a way of reducing labour costs. The de-
regulation of employment protection legislation (EPL), tightened activation demands in a
‘workfarist’ direction, the reduction of unemployment benefits and CB decentralization are
clear policy choices in this direction, as they all contribute to lowering labour costs directly
or indirectly.
To be sure, employers’ organizations are not monolithic in their orientations. For in-
stance, recent contributions (cf. Paster et al., 2019; Bulfone and Afonso, 2020) have
highlighted the preferences of Dutch and South European employers’ organizations for
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preserving the coverage of sectoral CB, primarily to prevent wage dumping from outsiders
and secure their own organizational survival. However, as these authors themselves recog-
nize, this selective defence of specific ‘coordinating’ institutions constitutes a partial excep-
tion to otherwise positive attitudes towards liberalizing interventions aiming at internal
devaluation—especially among export-oriented employers. Indeed, in all our cases, the pol-
icy preferences of large employers resonated with the EC’s Directorate-General for
Economic and Financial Affairs (2012a, pp. 103 and 104), which states that ‘employment-
friendly reforms’—ranging from minimum wage reduction and CB decentralization to em-
ployment deregulation—need to ‘result in an overall reduction in the wage-setting power of
trade unions’.
While heightened demands for liberalization and the corresponding loss of union influ-
ence in policy-making are by no means exclusive to Eurozone countries (Baccaro and
Howell, 2017; Rathgeb, 2018), we argue that tightened fiscal rules and wage surveillance
mechanisms in a common currency union aggravate such pressures. Figures 1 and 2 present
indicators supporting this claim. They suggest a trend towards competitive internal devalua-
tion in the Eurozone-11 countries relative to two groups of comparable advanced capitalist
economies outside the Euro area: non-Eurozone social democratic countries (Denmark,
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
EPL IR UB ALMPs
1990-1998 1999-2008 2009-2013
Figure 1. Liberalization scores across policy areas in the Eurozone-11 and in comparator country
groups (non-Eurozone social democratic countries and non-Eurozone liberal countries).
Notes: Higher scores indicate a higher incidence of liberalizing reforms. Notes: EPL ¼ ’Employment
protection legislation’; IR ¼ ’Industrial relations’; UB ¼ ’Unemployment and out-of-work benefits’;
ALMPs ¼ ’Active labour market policies’;
Eurozone-11 (EZ-11) ¼ AT, BE, DE, EL, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, NL, PT; non-Eurozone social democratic coun-
tries (Non-EZ-Soc-Dem) ¼ DK, IS, NO, SE; non-Eurozone liberal countries (Non-EZ-Liberal) ¼ AU, CA,
NZ, US, UK.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the ‘Liberalization Database 1970–2013’ liberalization index
(Armingeon et al., 2019); variables lib_epl, lib_ir, lib_neb, lib_almp.
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Iceland, Norway and Sweden) and non-Eurozone liberal countries (UK, USA, Australia,
Canada and New Zealand).
We consider the liberalization of labour market institutions as the observable manifesta-
tion of reform strategies aimed at an internal devaluation of the economy. Using the
‘Liberalization database 1970-2013’ developed by Armingeon et al. (2019), we compare the
depth of liberalization in the main policy fields of relevance for organized labour [EPL, in-
dustrial relations (IRs), unemployment benefits and active labour market policies (ALMPs)]
in three periods: 1990–1998, 1999–2007 and 2008–2013. We use the ‘liberalisation index’
score of Armingeon et al. (2019), which measures for each country-year the incisiveness of
liberalizing reforms on the basis of depth, encompassingness and impact of the policy change
introduced. Higher scores indicate more far-reaching liberalization, and vice versa. Figure 1
shows the period average of the liberalization index by policy field and country grouping.
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
Eurozone-11 core Eurozone-11 periphery
Non-Eurozone social democrac countries Non-Eurozone liberal countries
Figure 2. Determinant level of wage bargaining in the Eurozone core and periphery and in comparator
country groups.
Notes: Yearly averages by country groups. Lower scores denote greater decentralization of wage-set-
ting. Values of Level-D: 1 ¼ enterprise; 2 ¼ sectoral, with company agreements that specify or deviate
from sectoral agreements; 3 ¼ sectoral, binding for all further agreements; 4 ¼ cross-sectoral, with
company agreements that specify or deviate from central agreements; 5 ¼ cross-sectoral, sectoral and
company, with lower-level agreements that specify or deviate from higher-level ones; 6 ¼ cross-sec-
toral, with sectoral agreements that specify or deviate from central agreements; 7 ¼ cross-sectoral,
binding for all further agreements. Eurozone-11 core ¼ AT, BE, DE, FR, FI, LU, NL; Eurozone-11 periph-
ery ¼ EL, IE, IT, PT, ES; non-Eurozone social–democratic countries ¼ DK, IS, NO, SE; non-Eurozone lib-
eral countries ¼ AU, CA, NZ, US, UK.
Source: Authors’ calculations on ICTWSS version 6.0 (Visser, 2019); variable Level-D (level that deter-
mines the wage clauses in collective bargaining).
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These results bolster our account: the incisiveness of liberalization in EPL and IRs (i.e. all
regulations affecting the bargaining relationship between employers and employees, such as
bargaining levels, right to strike and union organizing) is consistently higher in Eurozone
countries, increasing markedly after 2008. This comparison suggests that the enhanced reli-
ance on internal devaluation since the global financial crisis in 2008 is distinctive of the
Eurozone countries, rather than a general development across the advanced capitalist
countries.
As the ‘Liberalization database’ stops in 2013, as does the OECD EPL strictness index,
we use the ICTWSS database (version 6.0) for indicators on CB up to 2017. It is important
to capture this recent period in order to evaluate whether policies of internal devaluation
gradually proceed from the periphery to the core. Our focus on CB arguably captures the
most pertinent area for reform strategies aiming at internal devaluation (Dustmann et al.,
2014). Figure 2 thus charts change over time in the determinant level of wage bargaining
across country groupings, customarily used as an indicator of CB liberalization (cf. Baccaro
and Howell, 2017; Meardi, 2018 ). We distinguish between the Eurozone’s periphery and
core countries to examine whether the push for internal devaluation is restricted to the coun-
tries hit hardest by the sovereign debt crisis.
The analysis highlights a trend towards greater decentralization of CB, affecting most
markedly the Eurozone periphery, but to some extent also the Eurozone core countries from
2013 onwards. This is consistent with our claim that trade unions in the core are not insu-
lated from the competitive pressures exerted by tightened fiscal rules and wage surveillance.
90
100
110
120
130
140
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Germany France Finland
Eurozone-11 Eurozone-11 core Eurozone-11 periphery
Figure 3. Nominal unit labour costs in the Eurozone-11 and selected countries (1999¼ 100).
Note: Eurozone-11 ¼ AT, BE, DE, EL, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, NL, PT; Eurozone-11 core ¼ AT, BE, DE, FR, FI,
NL; Eurozone-11 periphery ¼ EL, IE, IT, PT, ES.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Eurostat (tipslm20).
8 P. Rathgeb and A. Tassinari
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ser/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ser/m
w
aa021/5865479 by guest on 06 July 2020
While CB decentralization was more pronounced in the Eurozone core than in the periphery
during the post-crisis period, the picture in the two comparator country groups is one of sta-
bility over the whole period of investigation. Again, the Eurozone seems to be distinctive in
shifting the main costs of economic adjustment on to trade unions.
Whilst an analysis of the distributive outcomes of liberalization lies beyond the scope of
this article, further support for our argument can be found in the evolutionary trajectory of
the wage share (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). In contrast to growing rates in Nordic and
especially Anglo-Saxon non-Euro countries post-2008, the wage share declines markedly in
the Eurozone periphery and stagnates in the Eurozone core since the crisis onset.
Nominal unit labour costs (NULCs) and real exchange rates (REERs), both part of the
MIP’s economic scoreboard, can shed light on variations in the degree of competitive pres-
sures as a source of structural union power, which we claim are related to the degree of
union influence in policy-making (Figures 3 and 4). The picture is clear-cut: while NULCs
and REERs have remained low in Germany since the introduction of EMU, the cost compet-
itiveness of France and Finland gradually deteriorated relative to the Eurozone average. The
periphery’s wage freezes in response to the sovereign debt crisis contributed to the deterio-
rated competitiveness standing of France and Finland within the Eurozone. In fact, NULC
growth flatlined in the Eurozone since 2008, even though productivity growth was sluggish
too. Although Germany experienced NULC growth post-2008 relative to the Eurozone av-
erage, it maintained its comparative competitive standing, underlined by its outstanding
80
90
100
110
120
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Germany France Finland
Eurozone-11 Eurozone-11 core Eurozone-11 periphery
Figure 4. Real effective exchange rate in Eurozone-11 and selected countries (1999¼ 100).
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat (ert_eff_ic_a).
Notes: REER deflated by unit labour costs, relative to a panel of 37 countries. Eurozone-11 ¼ AT, BE,
DE, EL, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, NL, PT; Eurozone-11 core ¼ AT, BE, DE, FR, FI, NL; Eurozone-11 periphery ¼
EL, IE, IT, PT, ES.
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REER indicator. We may thus assume that trade unions in Germany are in a stronger posi-
tion to influence the policy-making process than their counterparts in France and Finland.
These figures certainly do not ‘dictate’ the fortunes of trade unions in the functionalist
sense that ‘there is no alternative’ to wage competition for countries struggling to stimulate
the economy. In fact, even the IMF (2012, 2016) contends that austerity and structural re-
form failed to generate stable growth, especially when implemented in a concerted effort
across countries (see also Pe´rez and Matsaganis, 2019). The economic failure of internal de-
valuation supports instead our class-based analysis because it suggests that the ‘new eco-
nomic governance’ primarily intensifies class discipline over organized labour, generating
political pressures rather than functional demands for liberalization.
3. Case selection and methodology
Following a most different systems design, our case selection strategy tests our argument
about the impact of competitive pressures (i.e. our explanans) on union influence in policy-
making (i.e. our explanandum), while simultaneously controlling for alternative ‘domestic
politics’ explanations. Our cases differ in important theoretical respects but are similar in
the theorized relationship between cost competitiveness and trade union influence (Table 1).
To enhance the validity of our claim, we briefly discuss how our case selection helps us to
rule out alternative ‘domestic politics’ explanations based on partisanship, union power and
varieties of capitalism.
First, the fortunes of organized labour could be conceptualized as a product of partisan
preferences (Ha¨usermann et al., 2013). Whilst we do not exclude that right-wing partisan-
ship may be associated with union defeats in policy-making, it does not explain the observed
variation. Indeed, the German red–green government imposed painful labour market
reforms on the unions prior to the Eurozone crisis (Agenda 2010), and French unions expe-
rienced similar defeats under socialist governments since 2015. In contrast, conservative-led
Table 1. Overview of case selection
France Finland Germany
Union power Low High Medium
Partisanship Left (Hollande, 2012–2017)
Centrist (Macron,
2017-present)
Cross-bloc (Katainen,
2011–2014)
Centre-right (Sipila¨,
2015–2019)
Grand coalition: centre-right
and centre-left (Merkel,
2005–2009)
Centre-right/liberal (Merkel,
2009–2013)
Grand coalition: centre-right
and centre-left (Merkel,
2013-present)
Varieties of
capitalism
State-led,
coordinated
Corporatist,
coordinated
Corporatist, coordinated
Competitive
pressure
High High Low
Union influence Low Low High
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grand coalitions provided unions with significant concessions in Germany, but not in
Finland.
A second alternative explanation would be that unions lost influence over policy-making
because they lost members, unity or legitimacy in public opinion (Culpepper and Regan,
2014). Finnish unions, however, suffered defeats since 2015 despite their exceptionally high
density of nearly 70% and their high levels of public trust. Whilst internal divisions facilitate
union marginalization, they are nevertheless a long-standing feature of French IRs, which
cannot account for recent changes in the extent of union influence. Thirdly, and finally, the
observed variation cannot be associated with differences in varieties of capitalism and firm-
level arrangements, as all three cases have been classified as CMEs, albeit France is a ‘special’
case due to its legacies of state-led economic adjustment. Taken together, our case selection
has several methodological advantages in examining the relationship between Eurozone-
related competitive pressures and trade union influence.
Methodologically, we use a ‘systematic process analysis’—often called process-tracing—
to test the hypothesized causal mechanism linking competitive pressures and union influence
in policy-making against the rival ‘domestic politics’ explanations described above (Hall,
2006; Trampusch and Palier, 2016). In this mode of causal analysis, the temporal sequence
of events is consequential for the outcome of interest, which requires the researcher to spec-
ify the hypothesized process in conceptual, operational and sequential terms.
As stated in the introduction, we consider the absence of any social compensation for CB
decentralization, employment deregulation, unemployment benefit cuts and tightened acti-
vation demands against union protests a case of ‘union defeat’. Our definition is in line with
the neo-corporatist concept of ‘political exchange’, which refers to a situation whereby trade
unions deliver wage restraint in return for union-friendly government policies that expand
welfare state arrangements (Pizzorno, 1978; Regini, 1984). The absence of any concession
excludes this political exchange in favour of a unilateral reform strategy that marginalizes
trade union demands. Operationally, we would observe a ‘union defeat’ if governments
rejected trade unions from the policy-making process altogether or trade unions legitimized
their consent to a particular reform purely for ‘damage limitation’ despite the absence of a
single positive concession to them. We derive empirical evidence for union influence from
the initial policy demands of trade unions, the subsequent reform negotiations between gov-
ernments and trade unions, and the degree to which the final reform corresponds to their ini-
tial policy demands.
So how, then, do we identify the causal mechanism leading to union defeats in policy-
making? First, we expect a deteriorating competitiveness situation in a context of low eco-
nomic growth to cause recommendations for the stimulation of internal devaluation through
the European Semester and the MIP, which facilitates the agenda setting of employer associ-
ations, bond traders and credit rating agencies. We thus expect to find that official docu-
ments from the EC converged towards a strategy of internal devaluation to the detriment of
unions in France and Finland, but not in Germany. The downgrading of a country’s eco-
nomic credibility from credit rating agencies would enhance market pressures for the stimu-
lation of an internal devaluation, especially in case of non-compliance with the EC’s policy
prescriptions.
Secondly, to link government action to the Eurozone’s institutional framework, we need
to find official statements where governments legitimize their reform plans against union
protests with reference to competitive constraints. We also use public opinion data to
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evaluate whether government’s reform plans contradict the policy preferences of electoral
majorities. Thirdly, trade unions should subsequently respond with negative reactions in
press statements or street demonstrations and industrial action. Our causal mechanism
expects the final policy output to contradict union preferences and provide no positive con-
cession if competitive pressures are high (France and Finland). In the absence of competitive
pressure, however, we expect a more balanced distribution of class power, which creates op-
portunities for trade unions to enhance their policy influence (Germany).
We ensure validity by combining evidence from different sources about the sequence of
labour market reform: official documents, parliamentary debates, media interviews, survey
data and secondary sources. The consulted primary sources from the EC and the European
Council on country-specific recommendations, MIP and excessive deficit procedures (EDPs)
are listed in the Appendix. To contextualize the degree and direction of domestic labour
market reforms, we draw on secondary sources and official country reports. Understanding
the dynamic of trade union disempowerment requires taking into account the sequence of
competitive internal devaluation over time, which initiated in today’s paradigmatic ‘core’
country during the 1990s.
4. A German Sonderweg: the rise of union influence—after its fall
The case of Germany illustrates how the absence of competitive pressures creates opportuni-
ties for trade unions to extract policy concessions (Table 2). Unlike the ‘periphery’ countries,
the German economy faced serious cost competitiveness problems prior to the Eurozone cri-
sis. As of the 1990s, high non-wage labour costs and rigid wage determination placed a bur-
den on private-sector employment, while growing debt levels made increases in public-sector
employment fiscally unsustainable. At the same time, the internationalization of supply
chains led to the mass offshoring of low-skilled manufacturing jobs (Baccaro and Benassi,
2016). Germany became thus emblematic of the ‘welfare-without-work’ problem (Iversen
and Wren, 1998). In response, employers’ associations, especially in the metal industry
(Gesamtmetall), leveraged the threat of relocation to deviate from industry-wide standards
(Dustmann et al., 2014) by withdrawing from sectoral agreements and pushing the state for
liberalizing labour market and welfare reforms. This economic environment in combination
with high unemployment led the Red–Green government under Gerhard Schro¨der (1998–
2006) to pursue unilateral reforms that aimed to reduce non-wage labour costs, deregulate
employment at the margins, incentivize faster job placement and enhance pressure on the
Table 2. Labour market reforms and related EU policy recommendations, Germany (2013–2018)
Policy area EU policy recommendations Reforms
Minimum wage increase – 2013 introduction of statutory hourly
minimum wage (implemented in 2015)
EPL re-regulation of
fixed-term employment
– 2016 re-regulation of temporary agency
work (restriction on contract duration and
application of equal pay principle)
2018 re-regulation of fixed-term contracts
with no ‘valid’ reason
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(long-term) unemployed to take up jobs deemed ‘suitable’ (Agenda 2010). Therefore, a social
democratic-led government no longer secured unions a privileged position in the reform process.
The above internal devaluation period coupled with fixed exchange rates greatly enhanced
Germany’s cost competitiveness relative to its Eurozone neighbours (see also Figures 3 and 4).
As a result, in 2012, Germany’s current account surplus was roughly as high as the combined
current account deficits of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012, p.
259). In line with our expectations, given this competitive advantage, the pressure for union ex-
clusion in Germany was largely absent during the crisis period. On the contrary, the grand coa-
lition actively reached out to the unions to pre-empt political conflict before the 2009 federal
election (Urban, 2012). The ensuing revival of tripartite consultations—also known as ‘crisis
corporatism’ (Urban, 2012)—led to labour-inclusive crisis policy responses. Mainly, unions
agreed on economic stimulus programmes and the stabilization of employment in the exposed
manufacturing sector (Dribbusch and Birke, 2014). In this respect, the expansion of short-time
work, which provides subsidies to employers who reduce workers’ hours rather than laying
them off, contributed to prevent a translation of GDP contraction into growing unemployment,
thus fuelling a ‘job miracle’ (Krugman, 2009). While labour-inclusive ‘crisis corporatism’
(2008–2009) was a temporary phenomenon, the subsequent Conservative–Liberal government
(2009–2013) also refrained from political conflict with organized labour.
The conservative-led grand coalition (since 2013) fulfilled then major policy demands
from the German union confederation (DGB): the introduction of a statutory nation-wide
minimum wage (2013), the temporary re-introduction of early retirement (2013), and the
re-regulation of temporary agency work (2016) and fixed-term contracts for which there is
no ‘valid’ reason to incentivize permanent employment (2018). All these steps helped to de-
viate from the previous internal devaluation path, albeit to a moderate extent (Lehndorff,
2016). The minimum wage of e8.50 gross per hour (2015)—about 50% of the median wage
and at a medium level from an EU-comparative perspective—aimed to curb low pay in a
context of declining CB coverage. Similarly, the re-regulation of temporary agency work tar-
geted the margins of the (manufacturing) workforce by re-introducing a maximum duration
of 18 months and equal pay after 9 months.
These policy concessions conform to our hypothesized connection between the intensity
of competitive pressures and unions’ relative policy influence. Specifically, the absence of
competitive pressures deprived German employers of the capacity to block union demands.
First, record-high current account surpluses and employment rates called into question the
warnings of the employer confederation BDA against the minimum wage’s potential ‘bur-
den’ on job creation (BT-Drucksache, 2014a, pp. 10 and 11; European Council, 2014, p.
23). As we would expect according to our theorized causal chain, the government invoked
the absence of competitive pressures as a reason for supporting the minimum wage. The
Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlandsspokesperson for labour market and social
affairs pointed to changed economic conditions to legitimize his party’s support for the mini-
mum wage, arguing that ‘the situation in 2014 is different from the one in 2002 and 2003’
(BT-Drucksache, 2014b, p. 4096). Secondly, Germany’s outstanding competitiveness also
facilitated unions’ efforts to influence public opinion in their preferred direction, by under-
mining the political discourse supporting aggressive wage moderation. In 2009, for example,
public support for a minimum wage increased to 85% in nation-wide opinion polls while
the amount of respondents perceiving economic conditions as ‘unfair’ increased up to 70%
in 2013 (Marx and Starke, 2017).
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Overall, competitive pressures were no longer a credible threat to block union demands.
Rather, their absence facilitated a more even level-playing field between labour and capital.
As Lehndorff et al. (2017, p. 215) argue, the ‘gradual comeback’ of German organized la-
bour cannot be understood without recognizing the ‘improved structural power’ of trade
unions and their successful public campaigns after a decade of pronounced internal devalua-
tion. To be sure, these measures have not substantively shifted Germany’s trajectory away
from its competitiveness strategy. Rather, post-crisis union achievements in Germany should
be seen as moderate deviations that help to sustain political support for Germany’s export-
led growth model (cf. Mabbett, 2016). Nonetheless, they indicate how the fortunes of trade
unions are enhanced when the issue of cost competitiveness cannot be politically mobilized
to push for liberalization against union protests.
5. Catching up with Germany: French trade unions after the crisis
France is exemplary of a core country where the gradual deterioration of
competitiveness vis-a`-vis Germany led to trade union defeats in the aftermath of the
Eurozone crisis (Table 3). Whilst the impact of the 2008–2009 financial crisis had been com-
paratively small, unemployment growth and the initial counter-cyclical crisis response ag-
gravated long-standing fiscal deficit problems. As the EC activated an EDP from 2009, the
French state had limited capacity to use fiscal spending in order to stimulate internal demand
for economic recovery. By 2012, France also experienced a growing trade deficit and
Table 3. Labour market reforms and related EU policy recommendations, France (2013–2018)
Policy area EU policy recommendations Reforms
CB decentralization MIP In-depth Review 2014–2017
EU Semester CSR 2013, 2014
2013 Loi portant se´curisation de
l’emploi, enacting national
cross-sectoral agreement (ANI)
2016 El Khomri Law
2017 ‘Macron’ labour reforms
EPL deregulation
(‘hiring’ and ‘firing’)
MIP In-depth Review 2012,
2013, 2015, 2016
EU Semester CSR 2011,
2012, 2015, 2016
2013 Loi portant se´curisation de
l’emploi, enacting national
cross-sectoral agreement (ANI)
2015 Macron Act
2015 Rebsamen Law
2016 El Khomri Law
2017 ‘Macron’ labour reforms
Unemployment benefit
retrenchment and
tightened activation
requirements
MIP In-depth Review 2015–2017
EU Semester CSR 2013–
2015, 2016
2015 Rebsamen Law
Reduction of non-wage
labour costs
MIP In-depth Review 2012–
2014, 2016, 2017
EU Semester CSR 2011–
2015, 2017
2012 Introduction of tax credit for
competitiveness and
employment (CICE)
2014 Pact of Responsibility and
Solidarity (Pact de
Responsibilite e Solidarite´)
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decreasing export market shares (OECD, 2015), with key industries such as car manufac-
turers Peugeot-Citroen suffering particularly.
In line with our expectations, the deterioration in external competitiveness vis-a`-vis
Germany generated demands from the EU Commission and employers for internal devalua-
tion (cf. Figures 3 and 4). The EU Semester recommendations in 2012 and 2013 flagged up
the divergence of French and German ULCs (European Council, 2012, p. 27, 2013a, p. 31)
and recommended measures to reduce labour costs (especially employers’ social security
contributions), expand firm-level flexibility in wage-setting and working conditions and re-
strain minimum wage growth. The implementation of ‘comprehensive structural reforms’
was an explicit condition for France to obtain fiscal leeway and an extension until 2015 to
rectify its excessive deficit situation (European Commission, 2013a, p. 6). The
Commission’s recommendations bolstered the requests of domestic employers’ confedera-
tion Medef, which repeatedly voiced demands over 2012–2013 for a ‘competitiveness shock
to help the exposed sectors’ (Financial Times, 2012a), advocating for cuts in labour taxes to
close the ‘gigantic gap’ with Germany’s labour costs (Financial Times, 2012b). Pressure
from the international financial markets piled on when the rating agency Moody’s down-
graded France’s bond rating in November 2012, citing declining export competitiveness and
excessive EPL rigidity as key risk factors (Moody’s, 2012).
Against this backdrop, the government’s attention shifted to export-promotion as the privi-
leged avenue of economic recovery, making external competitiveness the focus of political ac-
tion. Initially, Hollande attempted to pursue a negotiated reform strategy by involving the
unions in tripartite discussions. Social dialogue resulted in two agreements, signed only by the
moderate unions CFDT and CFTC: an inter-confederal concession bargaining agreement (ANI)
for ‘maintaining employment’ (‘se´curisation de l’emploi’) in 2013, which created a framework
for firms in financial difficulties to derogate temporarily from sectoral agreements (Rehfeldt and
Vincent, 2018, p. 160); and a ‘responsibility and solidarity pact’ (pact de responsabilite´) in
2014 that reduced employers’ social contributions to lower labour costs (Lux, 2015). Employer
associations and the EC, however, considered these measures as excessively timid because they
stopped short of addressing established ‘rigidities’ in labour market regulation.
As growth performance remained sluggish over 2014 and France struggled to meet its
deficit-reduction targets by 2015, pressures to continue with labour market liberalization in-
tensified. The MIP in-depth reviews (European Commission, 2014a, 2015a) again flagged
up cost competitiveness as a primary issue to be addressed to rectify France’s excessive
imbalances; and numerous CSRs issued between 2014 and 2016 reinstated the priority of re-
ducing labour costs and rigidities (Clauwaert et al., 2016). In 2014, the Commission restated
the importance of France’s relative competitiveness standing, highlighting that although
French ULC developments had been mostly aligned with Eurozone trends, ‘the difference be-
tween ULC developments in France and in Germany since 2000 has resulted in a deteriora-
tion of the relative cost competitiveness of France vis-a`-vis Germany’ (European
Commission, 2014a, p. 27). The Commission reinforced its recommendations by threaten-
ing in 2015 the activation of an excessive imbalance procedure in case of insufficient prog-
ress in structural LMP reforms (European Commission, 2015b). Again, these pressures
contributed to empowering domestic employers’ demands. For instance, in December 2014,
public protests led by the SME employer confederation CGPME called for lowering the tax
burden on companies, simplifying the labour code and introducing firm-level flexibility to
derogate from the 35-hours working week (Financial Times, 2014).
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Our theoretical argument would expect governments to respond to these competitive
pressures by implementing liberalizing reforms aimed at reducing labour costs. This was in-
deed the case. From 2015, Hollande subscribed to the idea that fostering external competi-
tiveness through supply-side reforms was the only available pathway to re-launch growth
within the Eurozone’s constraints. He thus adopted a strategy of unilateral labour market
liberalization, stating that ‘any measure using the budget to relaunch activity would increase
our public debt and worsen our foreign trade [deficit]’ (Financial Times, 2014). To be sure,
the implementation of liberalizing LMP reforms was aligned with the preferences of the
Socialist Party’s ‘modernist’ wing, which had embraced Schro¨der’s Agenda 2010 as the ex-
ample to follow in order to reinstate competitiveness (Amable and Palombarini, 2018, pp.
148–151). However, in the absence of mounting external competitive pressures, it is unlikely
that the Parti socialiste would have pursued such a politically risky path.
First, in 2015, the government pushed through, against joint union opposition, measures
deregulating rules on Sunday trading (Eurofound, 2015). Secondly, it introduced the
‘Macron Law’ and ‘Rebsamen Law’ to liberalize criteria for collective redundancies
(Clauwaert et al., 2016) and tighten the conditionality of unemployment benefits and social
assistance (Milner, 2017). Thirdly, in 2016, the government unilaterally implemented the
controversial ‘El Khomri Law’ (loi travail), without parliamentary debate. The reform in-
creased the scope for company-level bargaining to derogate from labour law and sectoral
agreements in working time regulation, overtime pay and wage setting, partly reversing the
hierarchy of the CB framework and allowing agreements to be concluded even by minority
unions representing 30% of the workers (Amable, 2017, p. 228); and widened the scope for
economic dismissals (Amable, 2017, p. 231).
These reforms were instances of union defeats, as no compensation was offered to orga-
nized labour even though mass opposition ensued. In the face of joint union resistance, the
government eventually retracted initial proposals for capping maximum dismissal severance
payments (Rehfeldt and Vincent, 2018, p. 162). However, FO and CGT remained strongly
opposed to the reform in its entirety (Eurofound, 2016a, 2017a), alongside the bulk of pub-
lic opinion (Rehfeldt and Vincent 2018, p. 162). Several strikes and mass demonstrations
(the so-called ‘Nuit Debout’ movement) were insufficient to halt the government’s interven-
tion (Amable, 2017, pp, 232 and 233). While the El Khomri Law fits into a long-term trajec-
tory of using decentralized bargaining to revise labour law, its degree of liberalization
exceeded all prior reform attempts in French IRs (Baccaro and Howell, 2017, p. 94).
Moreover, as Amable (2017, pp. 228–233) argues, it also represented a break in French
party competition because it was the first time that the Socialist Party actively pushed for la-
bour market liberalization—traditionally the prerogative of Gaullist governments.
Ensuing developments also conform to our theorized causal sequence. As France’s com-
petitiveness position remained negatively deviant from the Eurozone average post-2015,
pressures to continue with internal devaluation persisted. Whilst praising the El Khomri
Law (European Commission, 2017, p. 11), the 2017 MIP in-depth review restated the im-
perative of consolidating labour costs reductions by implementing decentralized firm-level
bargaining; revising minimum wage indexation; and reforming the unemployment benefits
system to strengthen work incentives (European Commission, 2017, pp. 11 and 19).
Simultaneously, rising bond yields reached in early 2017 Eurozone-crisis levels. In this con-
text, labour market liberalization became again a test for the French government’s credibil-
ity, functional to reinstate market confidence (Connolly, 2017).
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The newly elected centrist President Macron, therefore, implemented another far-
reaching labour market reform in September 2017. This went further than the El Khomri
Law as it directly reduced EPL by capping the maximum amount of dismissal compensation
(in line with Medef’s long-standing demands); facilitated firm-level bargaining without
unions in SMEs; and expanded the scope for firm-level agreements to derogate from sectoral
bargaining and labour law. Even though the reform was opposed by two-thirds of the elec-
torate (Financial Times 1/09/2017), Macron’s government prioritized compliance with the
EC and employers’ preferences for fostering external competitiveness—explicitly citing these
imperatives as the primary motivation (Eurofound, 2017b).
Unions remained critical and exercised opposition against the reform, although with differ-
ent strategies (Eurofound, 2017b). The second-largest radical confederation CGT organized
mass strikes in September 2017, whilst the largest reformist confederation CFDT did not join
in, adopting instead a ‘pragmatic’ attitude (Connolly, 2017). The third-largest union, FO, also
joined in the protests in November 2017 (ETUI, 2017). This belated broadening of the union
opposition front did not succeed in halting the reforms, which were enacted through executive
order in September 2017 and included not a single compensatory concession to unions.
6. North–North competition and Finnish union defeats
With different starting points and institutional legacies, the Finnish case provides an illustra-
tion of our theorized mechanism in a social–democratic regime (Table 4). It shows how the
Table 4. Labour market reforms and related EU policy recommendations, Finland (2013–2018)
Policy area EU policy recommendations Reforms
CB decentralization MIP In-depth Review 2016,
2017
2016 Competitiveness Pact
EU Semester CSR 2016
Wage restraint MIP In-depth Review 2012–
2014
2013 Pact for Employment and
Growth
EU Semester CSR 2015–2017 2016 Competitiveness Pact
Working time increases MIP In-depth Review 2012 2016 Tripartite Competitiveness Pact
MIP In-depth Review 2016
Unemployment benefit
retrenchment and tightened
activation requirements
MIP In-depth Review 2016,
2017
2014 Unemployment benefits reform
EU Semester CSR 2016–2018 2016/2017 Unemployment benefits
reform and amendment of
Employment Contracts Act
EPL deregulation
(‘hiring’ and ‘firing’)
– 2016/2017 Unemployment benefits
reform and amendment of
Employment Contracts Act
2018 Deregulation of dismissal
regulations for employees in
small firms
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rejection of union demands may take place in the wake of a deteriorating competitiveness
position despite high levels of associational and institutional union power in tandem with
corporatist traditions.
First, like in France, competitive pressures emerged in Finland after the crisis due to de-
clining export shares in the wake of intensified North–North competition. Up until 2008,
Finland had enjoyed an advantageous competitiveness position within the Eurozone due to
wage moderation and a competition strategy centred on technological innovation favouring
productivity growth (Kaitila, 2019, pp. 5–9). However, from 2012, its macro-economic
problem load intensified. The decline in external demand for key exports accelerated the de-
mise of its core sectors: the forestry industry and the electronics/information and communi-
cation technology (ICT) sector around Nokia (Kaitila, 2019, p. 12). Flagging export
performance contributed to a deteriorating current account balance and steep decline in
overall productivity growth (related to the problems of the high-productivity ICT sector; cf.
Kaitila, 2019, p. 12). This, in turn, triggered above-average ULC growth compared with
Eurozone trends in general and Germany in particular (van Gyes and Schulten, 2015, p.
159). In theory, as Krugman (2015) argued, Finland could have responded to the structural
challenges of intensified North–North competition (cf. Dølvik and Marginson, 2018, pp.
414 and 415) by devaluing its currency like in the early 1990s and expanding fiscal spending
to kick-start its economy at times of industrial restructuring. However, in reality, both
options were no longer available within the Eurozone’s institutional framework.
Consequently, as expected by our theory, the EC supported the employer association in
politicizing the problem of competitiveness. First, the EC’s MIP in-depth review procedure
found Finland to be experiencing macro-economic imbalances for five consecutive years
(European Commission, 2012b, 2013b, 2014b, 2015c, 2016), and the country-specific rec-
ommendations specifically mandated the alignment of wages to productivity developments
(e.g. European Council, 2013b). Secondly, these developments empowered employers’
requests for internal devaluation. In 2013, the Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK)
started advocating for a wage freeze (Eurofound, 2013) and greater flexibility to align wage
developments more closely with Germany (van Gyes and Schulten, 2015, pp. 159 and 160).
Against this backdrop, the focus of Finnish policy-makers also turned towards internal
devaluation as the main strategy for economic recovery (van Gyes and Schulten, 2015,
p. 158; Kaitila, 2019, pp. 13 and 14). The cross-bloc Katainen government (2011–2014)
pushed the peak-level employer and union federations to agree in 2013 on a ‘Pact for
Employment and Growth’ (2013), entailing pronounced wage moderation for 2013–2015.
As we would expect, the government presented this as necessary to make Finnish labour
costs lower than in its direct competitor countries, Sweden and Germany (Eurofound,
2014).
However, despite wage moderation, Finland’s growth performance and relative competi-
tiveness standing did not recover. Low growth deteriorated the outlook for public finances:
for the first time since the 1990s, in 2015 Finland’s public debt was poised to exceed the
SGP threshold of 60% of GDP. As we would expect, this triggered intensified pressures
from the EC and financial markets for further internal devaluation. The Commission’s MIP
in-depth review again highlighted excessive ULC growth in non-tradables as responsible for
Finland’s cost competitiveness deterioration (European Commission, 2014b). In October
2014, the rating agency Standard & Poor’s downgraded Finland’s AAA bond rating, identi-
fying as motivations a deteriorating external competitiveness standing, declining export
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market shares and rising labour costs (Reuters World General News, 2014). The EU
Semester country-specific recommendations in 2015 and 2016 re-affirmed demands to re-
move rigidities in wage-setting and increase labour supply (European Council, 2015, 2016).
The domestic employers’ confederation EK also reinstated that in the absence of currency
devaluation, further wage devaluation was necessary as the only way to ‘close down the gap
with competitor countries’ (Bloomberg, 2015).
As expected, although the links between wage growth and Finland’s competitiveness
problems were empirically disputed, the incoming centre-right coalition government of PM
Sipila¨ (comprising the Centre Party, the conservative National Coalition Party and the popu-
list right wing Finns Party) embraced the diagnosis about excessive ULC growth (Kaitila,
2019, p. 16). Hence, from 2015, reducing ULCs to address Finland’s ‘sustainability gap’ be-
came the focal point of the government’s reform agenda, to catch up with the internal deval-
uation pursued by other Eurozone member states and reassure markets. The following
quote by the Minister of Economic Affairs, Olli Rehn, illustrates the government’s motiva-
tion exhaustively: ‘. . . Case Finland [is] a case in point of a Northern Eurozone country that
is going through an internal devaluation in the era of a common currency – and pursuing
economic reforms in the spirit of Commission’s recommendations from the years 2010–
2014’ (Rehn, 2016).
In conformance with our theorized causal chain, the pursuit of internal devaluation in-
volved union defeats in policy-making. Breaking with Finland’s consensual tradition of cor-
poratist tripartite policy-making, in September 2015, the government used the ‘shadow of
hierarchy’ to force the social partners’ hand in wage-setting negotiations. PM Sipila¨ threat-
ened to intervene unilaterally via legislation to implement far-reaching structural reforms
(involving cuts to sick pay, overtime pay, vacation entitlements and employers’ social insur-
ance contributions) and spending cuts amounting to 1.5 billion Euro (Kaitila, 2019, p. 17).
Unions denounced the proposals as violations of CB freedom and reacted with mass public
protests and the first general strike in 20 years, which severely disrupted the country’s public
services (ETUI, 2016).
The government held back on unilateral intervention on the condition that the social
partners would autonomously agree to modify wage-setting institutions to improve relative
cost competitiveness. These threats were ultimately successful. In March 2016, the unions
eventually agreed on a macro-concession bargaining agreement, the ‘Competitiveness Pact’.
This involved a wage freeze for 2017, reduced pay for public sector employees, a shift in the
liability for social security contributions from employers to employees, an extension in an-
nual working time of 24 hours (without additional compensation), and a preliminary agree-
ment to renounce centralized peak-level CB and increase scope for company-level
bargaining (Dølvik and Marginson, 2018, pp. 415 and 416). The end of national-level CB
materialized in 2017, when the Confederation of Finnish Industries EK unilaterally termi-
nated all confederation-level national agreements (Eurofound, 2017c).
Although the agreement did not imply a single positive concession, the unions legitimized
their consent by claiming that the outcome was still ‘better than its alternatives’, and that it
rescued their future involvement in tripartite policy-making (Eurofound, 2016b).
Conversely, the agreement fulfilled long-standing preferences of manufacturing employers
for greater wage-setting flexibility through opening clauses and cross-economy wage moder-
ation through industry-led pattern bargaining, benchmarked against German wage costs
(Dølvik and Marginson, 2018; Mu¨ller et al., 2018). Whilst the Finnish CB system remains
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relatively centralized compared to other Eurozone countries, the demise of national-level
bargaining represented a defeat for the union movement, and a path-breaking shift towards
industry-level wage-setting—moving Finland closer to its competitors, Germany and
Sweden (Dølvik and Marginson, 2018, p. 415; Mu¨ller et al., 2018, p. 362).
In 2018, the Sipila¨ government passed legislation to intensify activation requirements for
the unemployed without consulting the unions (Eurofound, 2018a). It also advanced pro-
posals to deregulate fixed-term contracts for young people and reduce individual dismissal
compensation in small companies (Eurofound, 2018b). These have triggered strong union
opposition and large-scale industrial unrest (Eurofound, 2018c). The relative improvements
of Finland’s macro-economic position from 2018 and the election victory of the centre-left
cabinet in April 2019 may provide the unions with some leeway to reverse this trend—but
whether Finland will deviate from previous reforms remains to be seen.
7. Conclusion
Previous studies have considered the demise of trade union influence in policy-making an ex-
clusive feature of the countries hit hardest by the Eurozone’s sovereign debt crisis—i.e.
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (Armingeon and Baccaro, 2012; Culpepper and
Regan, 2014; Marginson, 2015). However, our quantitative evidence on liberalization in
the Eurozone and our qualitative findings from France, Finland and Germany suggest that
the rejection of union demands in policy-making is neither restricted in space to the periph-
ery nor restricted in time to the sovereign debt crisis. Although the periphery countries face
long-standing problems of innovation capacity, skill formation and productivity growth,
France and Finland have recently confronted the same source of pressure the periphery had
experienced during the sovereign debt crisis; namely, the Eurozone’s in-built demand to re-
store economic growth by closing down the competitiveness gap to Germany. It follows that
the Eurozone’s institutional framework has substantially enhanced the relevance of cost
competitiveness for the structural power of trade unions. Secondly, our findings also call
into question constructivist accounts that document a progressive turn in country-specific
recommendations towards the promotion of a more ‘Social Europe’ (Bakker 2017; Zeitlin
and Vanhercke, 2018). In our view, the ‘Social Europe’ hypothesis is difficult to sustain
when taking into account how fiscal rules and wage surveillance have affected union power
and labour market protections in member states.
We argue that the main reason for the ongoing decline of union influence on reform tra-
jectories across the core-periphery divide lies in the institutionalized reliance on competitive
internal devaluation in the Eurozone. In this framework, member states are under pressure
to compete against each other on wage and labour market flexibility when faced with an
economic slowdown, which creates incentives and opportunities for governments to impose
liberalizing reforms on trade unions in the interest of generating short-term business confi-
dence. The German case of union success buttresses this claim in the sense that the absence
of competitive pressures created opportunities for trade unions to partly reverse the tide of
internal devaluation against employer opposition.
While the evidence of this article is restricted to what we observed in three core cases and
through quantitative comparative indicators, our theoretical claims have wider application
to the remaining core countries—Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands—and thus open up
a new frontier for future research. The hypothesis emerging from this study is clear: export-
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oriented core countries, which benefited in the past from current account surpluses, are
likely to come under similar pressures for internal devaluation if their growth rates slow
down and competitive advantages exhaust from cuts in labour costs elsewhere or other ad-
verse shocks. While these countries have traditionally been hard-currency regimes well
equipped to strive in the Eurozone, our findings from Finland and France make it reasonable
to assume that cost competitiveness may turn into the political focal point if growth slows
down and alternative policy options remain constrained by fiscal rules and wage
surveillance.
The extension of our argument to the smaller core countries returns us to the case in
which the path of competitive internal devaluation started in the first place: Germany. The
post-Keynesian literature suggests that Germany holds the key to address the Eurozone’s
macroeconomic imbalances by pushing for pronounced wage increases and public invest-
ment (Stockhammer, 2016). Accordingly, Germany’s domestic revaluation would boost de-
mand for imports and thus undermine excessive current account surpluses, which create
more leeway for domestic economic reform among its trading partners. We find indeed suc-
cesses of union politics towards this direction (e.g. minimum wage), but the competitiveness
gap is still large from a comparative optic, as shown in the theory section of this article. It
remains to be seen whether the German DGB manages to reverse the tide of internal devalu-
ation, given the related threat of job losses among its powerful manufacturing unions and
the cross-partisan consensus around the country’s export-led growth model. The joint initia-
tive of the main manufacturing (IG Metall and IG BCE) and service unions (ver.di) to ex-
tend CB coverage and enhance firm-level co-determination are at least further steps in this
direction.
Our findings have important implications for future research in comparative political
economy and welfare state research. First, the political economy of competitive internal de-
valuation highlights that the trajectories of national varieties of capitalism must be placed in
a context of international interdependence. The Eurozone is a perfect illustration of how the
ever-closer integration of nation states in capitalist world markets translates developments
in one country into far-reaching consequences in others. However, much of today’s compar-
ative political economy is still based on a ‘methodological nationalism’ (Ebenau, 2015) that
treats nation states as discrete units that can be analysed independently. Future research
should thus be more attentive to international interdependencies in order to understand na-
tional differences.
Secondly, the institutionalized disempowerment of trade unions might call for a return of
theoretical attention to questions of class power (Culpepper, 2015). Against functionalist
perspectives, the EU new economic governance did neither solve the problem of uneven de-
velopment nor produce stable economic growth as such (IMF, 2012, 2016). Yet, it was suc-
cessful in enhancing class discipline over organized labour, in line with the theoretical
expectations of a critical political economy perspective (Erne, 2015; Bieler et al., 2019).
Even though the state-led rejection of union demands is not new and clearly predated the
Eurozone crisis (Rathgeb, 2018), the important point here is that institutional frameworks
based on fiscal rules and wage surveillance mechanisms may reinforce government activism
at the expense of trade unions while leaving untouched the financialized nature of the
Eurozone crisis itself. Seen in this way, institutional arrangements must be conceptualized in
light of their class power implications, and not their functional problem-solving capacities.
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In concluding, our findings suggest that the European economic and monetary integra-
tion process is likely to shape the future fortunes of organized labour and working people.
The reform trajectories of labour market and social policies cannot be understood without
recognizing the Eurozone’s in-built pressure to stimulate the economy through internal de-
valuation. We, therefore, believe that the political implication of our argument is that the
fortunes of labour movements rest to a growing extent on their transnational cooperation
against the ‘new economic governance’ in favour of concerted labour-friendly growth strate-
gies. While differences in national conflict settings and trade union organizations have posed
problems for such a transnational strategy in the past (Erne, 2015), it remains the most likely
source of union revitalization in the domestic policy-making arenas of an integrated
European labour market. The alternative, it seems, is a Eurozone-like race to the bottom.
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